Contracts and Sales by Boshkoff, Douglass
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship
1963
Contracts and Sales
Douglass Boshkoff
Indiana University Maurer School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Commercial Law Commons, Contracts Commons, and the State and Local
Government Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty
Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Boshkoff, Douglass, "Contracts and Sales" (1963). Articles by Maurer Faculty. Paper 1024.
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/1024
CONTRACTS AND SALES
DOUGLASS G. BOSHKOFFt
THE current article on contracts also contains a few cases on prod-
Iucts liability, which ordinarily would be discussed in a separate
article on sales. This year the two articles have been combined because
of the close relation between the cases. As in the past, only cases of
more than routine interest have been discussed in the text. All others
have been consigned to oblivion in the accompanying footnote.-
I
FORMATION OF CONTRACT
Offer and Acceptance. Enthusiastic but imprecise language on
an application for insurance coupled with inadequate processing
operations were responsible for the imposition of liability upon the
insurer in Gorham v. Peerless Life Ins., Co.2 The defendant sent
plaintiff's decedent, William Waldo Gorham, an application for acci-
dent insurance accompanied by advertising which urged hasty action.
Gorham completed the application and returned it with the first
month's premium. The policy was issued by the defendant on Decem-
ber 19, 1959, eight days subsequent to an accident which had caused
t Associate Professor, Indiana University School of Law; Member of the Michigan
and New York Bars.
1. Biagini v. Mocnik, 369 Mich. 657, 120 N.W.2d 827 (1963) (quantum meruit
recovery permitted in absence of express contract); Birchcrest Bldg. Co. v. Plaskove,
369 Mich. 631, 120 N.V.2d 819 (1963) (reformation denied after review of facts);
Fulton v. Kroger Co., 369 Mich. 539, 120 N.W.2d 232 (1963) (warranty action dismissed
for failure to establish causation); Board of Rd. Comm'rs v. North Am. Dev. Co.,
369 Mich. 229, 119 N.W.2d 593 (1963) (promise to third party constitutes consideration
for contract); Gilbert v. Vogelheim, 369 Mich. 530, 120 N.V.2d 179 (1963) (parol
evidence admissible to establish subject matter of sale); Goslin v. Goslin, 369 Mich.
372, 120 N.W.2d 242 (1963) (two memoranda sufficient to satisfy the Statute of
Frauds); Carrier Corp. v. Central Station Air Conditioning Co., 367 Mich. 605, 116
N.W.2d 777 (1962) (contract construed to grant exclusive dealership); Ginger v. Zis-
man, 366 Mich. 697, 116 N.W.2d 56 (1962) (suretyship contract unenforceable because
not in writing); W. J. Howard & Sons, Inc. v. Meyer, 367 Mich. 300, 116 N.W.2d 752
(1962) (use of practical construction by parties to explain ambiguous term in contract) ;
Jonna v. Diversey Corp., 368 Mich. 231, 118 N.W.2d 471 (1962) (no ambiguity in
contract); Kroninger v. Anast, 367 Mich. 478, 116 N.W.2d 863 (1962) (innocent mis-
representation by vendor of realty provided basis for rescission by vendee); Reinardy
v. Bruzzese, 368 Mich. 688, 118 N.W.2d 952 (1962) (defendant has burden of proving
that plaintiff failed to mitigate damages); Ridinger v. Ryskamp, 369 Mich. 15, 118
N.W.2d 689 (1962) (question as to whether option to purchase land could be exercised) ;
Sickels v. Berliner, 368 Mich. 474, 118 N.V.2d 248 (1962) (factual dispute as to terms
of contract).
2. 368 Mich. 335, 118 N.W.2d 306 (1962).
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Gorham's death. Plaintiff's executor then brought this action to reform
the policy so as to show an effective date prior to the date of death.
The trial court ordered a decree for plaintiff agreeing with his
contention that the defendant had delayed an unreasonable amount
of time in processing the application. This, coupled with the retention
of the advance premium, was thought to imply acceptance. Defend-
ant's feeble plea that it was busy and could not process the applica-
tion more rapidly was characterized by the trial judge as "a matter
of convenience" to the company and certainly no justification for its
conduct.
Relying heavily upon its previous decision in Wadsworth v.
New York Life Ins. Co.,3 the Michigan Supreme Court in an opinion
by Justice Kavanagh affirmed the action of the lower court. In the
Wadsworth case a combat pilot applied for life insurance and paid
the first premium. On the fourth of January, the policy was issued,
and although received by the agent on January 24, it was not delivered
to the insured because the agent supposedly had another form for the
insured to sign. Until the insured's death a little over three months
later, the company not only continued to correspond with the insured
with no mention that the policy might not yet be effective but also
received four subsequent monthly premium payments. Under these
circumstances the court held that there was a jury question on the
issue of unreasonable delay. The facts in the Gorham case do not
make as strong a case for acceptance by silence. Here there was no
subsequent dealing that might indicate satisfaction with the applica-
tion and no collection of any premium other than the first installment.
The period of silence after receipt of the completed application was
only ten days4 as compared with more than three months in Wads-
worth. Evidently the Michigan Supreme Court is now willing to con-
clude that even a short delay in processing an application indicates
that the policy has become effective. The standard by which the in-
surance company's action is now measured leaves little opportunity
for leisurely processing.
As is customary in these cases, the insurance company relied on
language that was supposed to prevent any obligation from arising
until the policy was actually issued. As is also customary in these
cases, the court refused to give effect to the language on the ground
3. 349 Mich. 240, 84 N.W.2d 513 (1957).
4. The application was first received by the insurer on November 16, 1959 but
it was incomplete and the insurance company returned it to Gorham for further in-
formation. The properly completed application was received on December 1. Therefore,
acceptance must have occurred in the interval between December 1 and December 11
when Gorham died.
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that it was ambiguous at best. While it is possible to question the
court's attitude toward ten days' silence, there can be no disagreement
with its conclusion that the language did not give fair warning of
the fact that the insurance might not be immediately effective. The
language of the application and advertisement called attention only
to the need for haste and not to the possibility of no protection prior
to approval of the application.5 Possibly a letter of acknowledgement
calling attention to the prospective delay in processing might prevent
recurrence of the result in the instant case. On the other hand, we
may wonder if even such a letter could adequately explain to the
applicant that the company was going to move in a leisurely fashion
although it had urged him to proceed as rapidly as possible.
Consideration. In Easley v. Mortensen,6 the plaintiffs claimed
that the defendant had promised to see that premises subject to a
mortgage foreclosure would not be lost through expiration of the
statutory redemption period.7 Evidently, refinancing, which never
materialized, was contemplated. Plaintiffs' suit for damages$ was
dismissed after their counsel's opening statement on the theory that
there was no consideration for the asserted promise. This was cor-
rect since the element of exchange was lacking. However, assuming
that plaintiffs' claim of reliance in not securing refinancing could be
proved, there appears to be no reason why promissory estoppel as
defined in the Restatement of Contracts9 should not provide a substi-
tute for consideration.
5. The application stated:
SPECIAL OFFER I
Send only $1.00 for your first month's premium, during which time you
will be completely insured. One application covers the whole family. If you decide
to keep the policy you can then pay the monthly rate....
There followed on the reverse side, this statement:
INTRODUCTORY OFFER
Only $1.00 covers the first month's introductory premium regardless of the number
of persons on this application. After the first month you pay only the low rates
below.
(368 Mich. at 338, 118 NAV.2d at 307.)
6. 370 Mich. 115, 121 N.W.2d 420 (1963).
7. Mich. Comp. Laws § 6193 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27.1113 (1962) (one
year). This section was subsequently repealed by Mich. Pub. Acts 1961, No. 236.
8. One day prior to the expiration of the mortgage redemption period, defendants
informed plaintiffs that they could not honor their promise. Plaintiffs managed to sell
the property and sued to recover the difference between the fair market value and the
price realized on a forced sale.
9. "A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which
does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by
enforcement of the promise." Restatement, Contracts § 90 (1932).
1963]
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Duress. By statute" in Michigan a taxpayer may pay, under
protest, certain taxes and special assessments and then within thirty
days sue to recover the accounts paid. However, in Beaclawn Bldg.
Corp. v. City of St. Clair Shores," the validity of charges for build-
ing permits was in question and the statutory section did not provide
a protest procedure. Since defendant city refused to accept any pay-
ment under protest, the plaintiff paid in full without formal protest,
subsequently bringing suit to recover the alleged overcharges. Justice
Dethmers held that this procedure was proper since the evidence
established that the payments were involuntary. The court stressed
the fact that the payments were involuntary because the builder
could not safely proceed without first obtaining the permits in ques-
tion.
II
PROBLEMS OF PUBLIC POLICY
Twice during the period covered by this Survey, the court was
required to decide whether enforcement of an otherwise valid contract
*'as to be denied because of certain public policy considerations.
Opposite conclusions were reached in the two cases.
In re Muxlow Estate2 involved the claim by a wife through her
administratrix to a share of her deceased husband's estate. An ante-
nuptial agreement was invoked to bar the wife's claim and thus
drew in question the validity of the pact. The wife's administratrix
argued that the contract tended to facilitate or condone separation
or divorce and therefore violated public policy. The reasoning behind
Justice Souris' rejection of this argument appears in one paragraph of
the opinion:
The second and the fourth paragraphs of the foregoing agreement are
the ones relied upon by appellant to establish the claim that it was
entered into in contemplation of a future separation. The second para-
graph, it is true, recites that the intention of the parties was to pro-
vide for disclaimer by each of any interest in the property of the
other upon termination of the marital relation as well as upon death.
Of controlling significance, however, is the fact that notwithstanding
the express desire of the parties, the agreement contains mutual dis-
claimers effective only upon death. Whatever may be said concerning
the desire and motives of the parties at the time of execution of the
agreement, the fact remains there is no language in the agreement
which effectively barred either party from claiming an interest in
the property of the other had their marital relation terminated prior to
the death of one of the parties.' 3
10. Mich. Comp. Laws § 211.53 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 7.97 (1960).
11. 370 Mich. 128, 121 N.W.2d 427 (1963).
12. 367 Mich. 133, 116 N.W.2d 43 (1962).
13. Id. at 136, 116 N.W.2d at 45.
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Although the test is clear, correct application of it in this case
would seem to call for a contrary result. The paragraph to which
Justice Souris directed his attention called for the release of,
... any and all claims of any kind and nature in and to the prop-
erty, both real and personal, of the other party which includes any
claim oj dower or curtesy and any right or claim which might accrue to
them upon the death of the other by virtue of any law .... 14 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Apparently the court wished to adopt the position that the claims
referred to in the italicized portion of the last quoted language
limited the scope of the term "all claims" immediately preceding it.
This construction is hard to accept on its face. It becomes even more
implausible when we remember that immediately preceding and fol-
lowing the quoted language the parties made it clear that they wished
to have the agreement operative upon the termination of the marriage
relationship even when the cause was one other than death.
In the second case concerning public policy, Groening v. Now-
len,"5 the plaintiff sought cancellation of a deed given as security
for repayment of money misappropriated from his employer. His
argument was that the deed was invalid because given in consideration
of the defendant's promise not to prosecute. The trial court set aside
the deed and ordered a reconveyance of the premises. At the same
time the plaintiff was ordered to account to the defendant for the
misappropriated funds.
On appeal defendant argued that the 1932 decision of the court
in Wilhelm v. King Auto Fin. Co. 6 sanctioned the practice in ques-
tion and repudiated earlier cases supporting the action of the trial
court in the instant case. Chief Justice Carr, speaking for a unanimous
court, rejected this contention and stated concerning the Wilhelm
case: "Had it been intended to modify the general rule asserted in
Buck v. First National Bank of Paw Paw we have no doubt that such
intention would have been clearly expressed.""
A reading of the Wilhelm opinion discloses language-" which
14. Id. at 135, 116 N.W.2d at 45.
15. 369 Mich. 28, 118 N.W.2d 998 (1963).
16. 259 Mich. 463, 244 N.W. 130 (1932).
17. Supra note 15, at 34, 118 N.V.2d at 1001.
18. Justice North, who wrote the majority opinion, quoted with approval the
following language from the lower court's opinion:
The court is of the opinion that the transaction in question is not subject to
being voided for the reason that the defendants' mortgage was obtained by duress.
There does not seem to the court to have been any bad faith in what was done
with relation to Wilhelm. He undoubtedly was guilty, and he and his family un-
doubtedly sought to make restitution with a view to having the proceedings
dropped. The acceptance of restitution was in no sense improper, and no fraud
1963]
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certainly appears to support the conveyance in the instant case.
Nevertheless, it is also clear that the current court wishes to limit
the effect of Wilhelm to its particular facts and will not follow it. It
should also be noted that the decision in the instant case merely de-
prives defendant of his security for repayment of the debt. The basic
obligation to repay the misappropriated funds remains intact.
III
PROBLEMS OF INTERPRETATION
The Survey period produced two decisions on interpretation of
contracts. The first opinion by Justice Kelly reflects a sensible, real-
istic approach to a difficult problem. The second opinion by Justice
Black unfortunately illustrates an unrealistic approach to an equally
troublesome question.
Assignments. In 1952, plaintiff in Cinderella Theatre Co. v.
United Detroit Theatres, Corp.19 entered into a fifteen year lease of
a theatre with defendant-lessee. In 1958, after the theatre had operated
at a loss for six years, the defendant decided to avail itself of an
alleged right to terminate the lease and its liability through an assign-
ment to a third person. In this respect, article 14 of the lease pro-
vided:
It is further expressly understood and agreed that no assignment
or conveyance of this lease of the leasehold estate hereby created may
be made by the lessee unless and until the lessee shall have first de-
posited with the lessor as advance rent the further sum of $39,333,
which said deposit shall be applied to the payment of the rental
accruing under this lease during the last 12 months of the 15th year
of the term hereof, and unless the assignee shall assume and agree to
perform all of the covenants and conditions of this lease on the part
of the lessee to be performed. Upon said additional deposit in this
article provided for being made, and notice given by the lessee to the
lessor of such assignment accompanied by a copy of the document of
assignment and assumption, the lessee, United Detroit Theatres Cor-
poration, shall automatically be relieved and released from each and
every of the covenants in this lease contained.
It is further expressly understood and agreed that if and in the
event, after said additional deposit of $39,333 provided for in this
article is made, this lease be terminated by the lessor by reason of
or deceit was practiced upon the court or upon court officials. The judge and the
prosecutor both knew what had been done. If, in their judgment, it was proper
to drop the proceedings, the public has been protected, as far as the law con-
templates. If the law were as contended for by the plaintiff, it would be impossible
for any injured and defrauded plaintiff to make a settlement which could not be
subsequently repudiated in a proceeding like this. I do not believe that justice
demands such a rule.
259 Mich. at 468, 244 N.W. at 131.
19. 367 Mich. 424, 116 N.W.2d 825 (1962).
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default on the part of the lessee or its assignee in the payment of the
rental hereinabove reserved and agreed to be paid, or by reason of the
default of the lessee or its assignee in the observance or performance of
any other covenant or condition of this lease on the part of the lessee or
its assignee, then and in such event said sum of $39,333 deposited with
the lessor pursuant to the provisions of this article shall also belong
to and be kept and retained by the lessor free and discharged of any
and all claims, rights or interest of the lessee and its assignee therein
and thereto and as and for liquidated damages of the lessor occasioned
by such default on the part of the lessee or its assignee. 20
The prescribed procedure was followed by defendant and this
action was subsequently commenced by plaintiff to set aside the assign-
ment and hold defendant responsible for rent payments accruing after
the date of the assignment. The Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed
the action of Circuit Judge Horace W. Gilmore in granting the relief
requested by plaintiff.
In reaching this result, the court took a position contrary to that
assumed by three other courts which have been confronted by similar
problems. The Supreme Courts of Kentucky2 l and Idaho,2" and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 23 in similar cases
have all permitted a lessee to escape further liability by assigning
his interest. As Corbin has stated, "these cases look suspiciously like
those in which a 'joker' is included in the terms of the contract (no
'joke' to the unwary obligee) .1124 However, removal of the "joker"
from the deck is not without its difficulties.
One approach would be to adopt the position that there is an
implied promise to assign only to a financially responsible assignee.
There are several difficulties with this theory, however. First, in
Michigan there is a statute2r prohibiting the implication of covenants
in certain cases. Second, the policy of requiring financially responsible
assignees would involve second-guessing the assignor's judgment at a
much later date. Finally, it appears that no reasonable interpretation
of the contract clause in question can lead to the conclusion that a
financially responsible lessee is necessary in all cases, and it appears
from a reading of the opinion in the Cinderella case that the court did
not take this approach.
The court in the instant case adopted the alternative of insisting
that the assignor act in good faith. The evidence showed that the
20. Id. at 427, 116 N.W.2d at 826-27.
21. Alexander v. Theatre Realty Corp., 253 Ky. 674, 70 S.W.2d 380 (1934).
22. J. R. Simplot Co. v. Chambers, 82 Idaho 104, 350 P.2d 211 (1960).
23. Ramey v. Koons, 230 F.2d 802 (5th Cir. 1956).
24. 4 Corbin, Contracts § 866 n.39 (Supp. 1962).
25. Mich. Comp. Laws § 565.5 (1948), Mich. Stat. Ann. § 26.524 (1953).
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assignee was wholly owned and controlled by the assignor. As Judge
Gilmore stated: "I can not conceive of [the assignee] being anything
but the tool, instrumentality and agency of the parent and it is my
opinion that is not what was intended by the writers of article 14. ... "
An examination of the three similar cases outside Michigan dis-
closes that, in two of them,2 7 there was little evidence of bad faith
surrounding the transaction. The third case28 can be distinguished on
the ground that, although the assignor may have acted in bad faith,
there was a substantial period of time in which the lessor failed to
object. This was not the situation in the instant case.
The decision in Cinderella should not be read as an indication
that the court will always be willing to remove the "joker." A clause
permitting assignment and concurrent release from liability is unde-
sirable for the lessor since it can often operate as advance consent
to a novation. If the lessor cannot insist that the assignor's liability
will continue even after the assignment, then prudence dictates that
an attempt be made to insure that the assignee will be acceptable by
describing the class of persons or corporations to which a valid assign-
ment may be made. Absent this, the decision in the instant case is
welcome because it indicates that the court is well aware that com-
mercial contracts must rest upon a foundation of good faith and
practice in the performance of duties and in the exercise of rights.
Here the court properly frustrated the defendant's attempt to have its
cake and eat it too 9
26. Quoted by the court. Supra note 19, at 429, 116 N.W.2d at 827.
27. Alexander v. Theatre Realty Corp., supra note 21; Ramey v. Koons, supra
note 23.
28. J. R. Simplot Co. v. Chambers, supra note 22.
29. The following facts from the record appear in the opinion of the court:
(1) Prior to November 8, 1958, Pontiac not only agreed to accept the assignment
of the lease but also entered into an oral management agreement with the UDT,
by the terms of which UDT was to supervise the buying and booking of ifims
at the Cinderella, was to handle finances, advertising, maintenance, and take care
of accounting and auditing;
(2) The assignment in question was executed on behalf of Pontiac and UDT by
Mr. Harold Brown and Mr. E. J. Welling who held identical positions in both
corporations. The instructions that Mr. E. J. Welling received with respect to
the assignment as an officer of UDT in no way differed from the instructions he
received with respect to the assignment as an officer of Pontiac;
(3) From the date of assignment until the date of trial, no salaries were paid by
Pontiac to any of its officers;
(4) Films which are exhibited in the Cinderella Theatre are booked and purchased
by Mr. Thomas Beyerly who is an employee of UDT, and is paid by UDT and
not by Pontiac. All contracts entered into by the Cinderella Theatre are signed
by Woodrow Praught, President of both UDT and Pontiac. However, Mr. Praught
receives no salary from Pontiac;
(5) Price-Waterhouse performs auditing services for the Cinderella Theatre and
is paid therefore by UDT, not Pontiac;
[Vol. 10
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Releases of Liability. An equally difficult case which came before
this court during the last year was Hall v. Strom Constr. Co. 0 Un-
fortunately, the case did not receive the common sense treatment
afforded the one just discussed and presumably the court will be
forced to return again to the same problem.
The plaintiff here was injured in an accident. He settled with
defendant's insurance company and signed a release. At the time
the release was executed, all parties concerned assumed that he had
only suffered a concussion and back injuries. There was no question
of fraud or misrepresentation. Subsequently, plaintiff discovered that
he was suffering from epilepsy traceable to the accident. Both the
trial judge and supreme court agreed that the release should be set aside
on the basis of mutual mistake.
Cases concerning the validity of such releases have been plaguing
the courts for years and Justice Black referred in his opinion to a
recent and lengthy A.L.R. annotation on the topic." Certainly most
of the release cases are hard ones. On the one hand stands the injured
man who has compromised his claim for what often turns out to be
a pittance. On the other hand stands the insurance company in
possession of a release which it obtained in good faith. Courts have
struggled to give relief to the injured party while rationalizing the
result within the traditional framework of contract law. Slowly, how-
ever, it has been realized that this may be an unobtainable goal and
that release cases may be in a class by themselves 2
The argument against judicial interference with contractual ad-
vantage is that security of business transactions is thereby promoted
and such security is desirable because it protects the reliance of busi-
nessmen.13 This argument has not been effective in the case of releases
because the vitally interested party, the insurance company, has not
been able to present a convincing plea that in the ordinary case it
has changed its position in reliance upon the release. Nevertheless,
(6) Nearly 1 year after the assignment, in October of 1959, the stationery of UDT
still listed the Cinderella as 1 of its theatres. In addition, UDT listed the Cinderella
Theatre as one of its theatres in gift books sold to the public, and the uniforms
of the ushers of the Cinderella Theatre in April of 1961 bore the insignia 'U.D.T.';
(7) In a press release prepared by UDT and submitted to the Detroit newspapers
in February of 1959 when Mr. Praught was appointed President of UDT, the
Cinderella was listed as a UDT theatre.
367 Mich. at 434-35, 116 N.V.2d at 830.
30. 368 Mich. 253, 118 N.W.2d 281 (1962).
31. Annot., 71 A.L.R.2d 82 (1960).
32. See the concurring opinion of judge Frank in Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R.R.,
153 F.2d 757, 767 (2d Cir. 1946).
33. Counsel for defendant unsuccessfully advanced this argument. See supra
note 30, at 260, 118 N.W.2d at 285.
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courts have hesitated to acknowledge this. Instead they have paid
lip service to the principle of security of transactions, and then have
set aside the release on the particular facts. For example, in this
particular case Justice Black stated: "Thus may the 'modern trend'
of authority be now applied without unduly affecting the valued right
of contract by which out-of-court settlements, of claims for personal
injuries, are fairly and understandingly negotiated and effectively
completed. '34 (Emphasis supplied.)
To accomplish such a result the court resorted to a distinction in
the well-worn law of mutual mistake. According to Justice Black the
release may be set aside when ". . . the releasor's proof persuasively
shows a fair and mutual want of knowledge of a hidden injury which
eventually comes to consequential light, distinguished from a then
want of knowledge of unexpected adverse consequences of a known
yet apparently negligible injury."35 The crucial issue is then said to
be whether or not Hall knew of the brain injury.
With all due respect for the court, it appears that this is a mean-
ingless verbal distinction, although one that enjoys some popularity.3
In the instant case the characterization of the brain damage as injury
instead of consequence solves the problem and renders the suggested
legal principle of no analytical value. Hall suffered a blow on the
head and a brain concussion. The court says the subsequent epilepsy
was caused by an unknown injury and therefore not covered by the
release. But why was it not a subsequent consequence of a known in-
jury and therefore covered by the release? Is the court committed to
the position that a disabling scalp infection incident to the blow on the
head would be covered by the release? Only the future can tell but
scepticism is justified.
The opinion in this case illustrates dramatically the pitfalls which
await a court trying to reach a correct result while adhering to tra-
ditional doctrine. The decision in the Hall case refuses to extend the
security of business transaction rationale where it apparently is un-
necessary. There is no criticism of this aspect of the case. However,
the benefits of an essentially pragmatic approach to a particular set
of facts are somewhat dissipated by the court's reliance upon a formula
which disguises the true issue. Attorneys are now invited to litigate
the hidden injury-consequence issue, when the real problem is one
of fairness. It is regrettable that the court could not or would not artic-
ulate the basic policies underlying its decision.
34. Id. at 254-55, 118 N.W.2d at 282.
35. Id. at 258, 118 N.W.2d at 284.
36. See the discussion and cases cited in 6 Corbin, Contracts § 1292 (Supp. 1962).
[Vol. 10
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Application for Insurance. In Merrill v. Fidelity Cas. Co.,3 7 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied a claim
based upon a life insurance policy sold through a vending machine
at the Flint, Michigan, airport. The application was not personally
signed by the insured as required by its terms but was executed by
the insured's father who was one of the beneficiaries. The court
found the condition clear and unambiguous and refused to inquire into
the reasonableness of the condition. Although two different courts
are involved, the contrast with Justice Black's opinion in Hall is
marked. There clear language was disregarded, 8 here it was respected.
The court in the Merrill case disclaimed the necessity for appraising
the justification of the language used. 9 However, it is still possible
to wonder whether the varying approaches illustrated by the two cases
does not in fact spring from a judgment as to the need for the pro-
tection sought by the insurance company in the respective cases.
IV
WARRANTY LmBILITY
This year the sales cases which would traditionally be grouped in
a separate article appear here under one topic heading. As in the
past there has been some discussion of privity as a defense to breach
of warranty. In last year's Survey article there was some speculation
as to whether the decision in Spence v. Three Rivers Builders &
Masonry Supply, Inc." marked the end of privity as a defense in
Michigan.4 There have been no opinions by the Michigan Supreme
Court on this subject during the past year. However, the Sixth
Circuit4 2 and Judge Levet in the Southern District of New York"
have both indicated that they read the Spence opinion as abolishing
the defense of privity in Michigan.
The final case, Barefield v. La Salle Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,44
was an appeal by the plaintiff from an adverse jury finding in a warranty
37. 304 F.2d 27 (6th Cir. 1962).
38. The release in the Hall case covered "... all known and unknown personal
injuries. . " Hall v. Strom Constr. Co., supra note 30. Brief for Appellants p. 5.
39. ". . . [S]ince the condition is clear and unambiguous .. . it is unnecessary
to pass upon the question whether it is reasonable or unreasonable, as the parties are
bound by the clearly expressed and dearly understood conditions of their contract
and, in such case, no factual question remains for the determination of a jury." 304
F.2d at 29.
40. 353 M ich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958).
41. Boshkoff, Sales and Secured Transactions, 1962 Survey of Mich. Law, 9 Wayne
L. Rev. 181, 181-83.
42. Schultz v. Tecumseh Prods., 310 F.2d 426, 429 (6th Cir. 1962) (dictum).
43. Conlon v. Republic Aviation Corp., 204 F. Supp. 865 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
44. 370 Mich. 1, 120 N.W.2d 786 (1963).
1963]
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action. Her claim was based upon the alleged presence of ground
glass in a bottle of Coca-Cola. Evidence was offered by the defendant
to establish that she continued to drink the beverage after tasting
something that should have warned her that it was defective. The
trial judge's instruction on this point mentioned "assumption of risk,"
and plaintiff argued that is was incorrect to use tort concepts in a
warranty action. The court affirmed the verdict for defendant al-
though admitting that it was inaccurate to talk about assumption of
risk. There was, nevertheless, an issue as to whether plaintiff had
used the product in disregard of a known danger and the instruction
given stated the essence of an available defense.
